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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
Respondent,

JENSEN'S USED CARS,

Case
No. 8741

vs.

Appellant.

JAMES T. RICE,

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of the
State of Utah
HONORABLE RAY VAN COTT,

JR.,

District Judge

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for a deficiency Judgment brought by
Jensen's Used Cars against James T. Rice on a Conditional
Sales Contract for an automobile purchased by the Defendant,
and an action on a check given to the Plaintiff by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff, Jensen's Used Cars, is a nonentity under
which Mr. Thomas Hunsaker does business as a used car dealer.
On or about August 12, 195 5, Mr. Victor W. Jones brought

3
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a 1955 Ford Mainline 6 Sedan to the home of Mr. Rice.
During the conversation that ensued, the price of the automobile was discussed, but Mr. Jones apparently did not have
a full understanding of the terms and conditions of the sale.
It was finally agreed that the automobile would be left in the
possession of Mr. Rice, whereupon Mr. Rice delivered a check
dated August 13, 1957 to Mr. Jones in the amount of $200.00,
and signed a contract in blank.
On or about the 17th day of August, 1955, Mr. Rice went
to the Walker Bank & Trust Company of Murray and signed
a Conditional Sales Contract and a Promissory Note, Exhibits
2 and 3. The cash balance was $1850.00 of which $50.00 represented sales tax and license plates, which were never obtained. The evidence indicates, and this is not controverted
by Plaintiffs testimony, that Mr. Rice signed this Contract with
the understanding that the Plaintiff, Mr. Hunsaker, was to
refund to him the sum of $100.00, and in or~er to protect
himself and to see that this was done, he stopped payment on
the $200.00 check which had previously been delivered to
Mr. Jones.
The Defendant, James Rice, operated the car for 19
days until the sticker ran out, and then parked it at his
home until November 9, 1955, at which time it was
picked up in front of his home by Mr. A. J. Carter, a representative of the Walker Bank & Trust Company in Murray,
and returned to the Hunsaker automobile lot. Thereafter it
was sold across the Salt Lake Auto Auction.
On December 7, 1955, the Plaintiff paid off the contract
to Walker Bank & Trust Company paying the amount of
4
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$1,860.00, and thereafter commenced this action for recovery

on the deficiency represented by the difference between the
amount claimed for the car as received from the Salt Lake Automobile Auction and the amount paid to the bank, and for the
$200.00 represented by the check which has never cleared the
Bank.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff
and submitted the question of attorney fees and the matter
of the $200.00 check to the jury for a decision upon interrogatories.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Relied on for Reversal
1. The Court erred in refusing to grant Defendant's Mo-

tion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint failed to
state a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be
granted.
2. The Court erred

in having directed a verdict for the

Plaintiff and against the Defendant upon its own Motion in
the following particulars:
(a) That there was sufficient evidence to be presented
to the jury on the basis of whether a contract was ever executed
by the Defendant since delivery of the executed contract to
the Walker Bank & Trust Company as agent for the Plaintiff
was conditional upon the refund to the Defendant of $100.00
by the Plaintiff, or installing a radio in the automobile.
(b) That there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on
the matter of failure of consideration in as much as the whole
consideration for the contract was returned to the Plaintiff.

5
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(c) That there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury
on the question of whether a contract had ever in fact been
executed since there was a dispute in the evidence as to whether
there had been a meeting of the minds of the parties on the
amount of the purchase price of the automobile.
3. The Court erred in failing to allow the Defendant to
introduce Exhibits 8 and 9.
4. The Court erred in instructing the jury on the special
interrogatories in that it failed to set forth the Defendant's
theory of the case, and further erred in instructing the jury
after argument of Counsel and allowing the Attorney for the
Plaintiff to discuss the instructions in front of the jury and
thereby granting them in effect a contradictory instruction.

STATEMENT AND ARGUMENT
The fundamental questions to be determined here as the
writer sees them are:
1. Whether the Court on its own Motion should have

granted a directed verdict in favor of the Plaintiff.
2. That the Court erred in the other instructions and in

the manner and time the instructions were given.
ARGUMENT
It is our main contention that the Court erred in directing a
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and that on the basis of any
one of three theories there was sufficient evidence to take this
matter to a jury.
6
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The evidence shows that the night the automobile was
delivered to the Defendant, that a Contract was signed in
blank; however, this contract was apparently never used, and
was either destroyed or is still in the files of the Plaintiff. The
actual contract sued upon was signed by Mr. Rice at the office
of the Walker Bank & Trust Company in Murray in the presence of Mr. Frank Nelson. However, even though the contract
did not state the purchase price as understood by Mr. Rice,
he signed the document with the reservation that the Plaintiff
was to refund to him $100.00 or install a 6 tube radio in the
automobile. That this was Mr. Rice's understanding of the
contract is clearly indicated throughout the record of his
testimony. On direct examination he testified as follows:
(Trans. 68):
A. nOn the 17th of August. I signed the stop payment
order on that at the same time Mr. Jones called
me and told me that he had made arrangements
at Murray Bank with Frank Nelson to finance this
car. I immediately called Mr. Nelson for what
amount he was making this note for and he told
me and I went right directly to my bank at that
moment and stopped payment on that check. I
checked with my bank to be sure."
Q. ((Yes. On the 17th of August, is that right?"
A . "Yes. ,,
Q. And the day after, on the 18th, you went into the
Murray Bank, the day following you went into the
bank and signed a contract and by the terms of
which you agreed to pay $2045.70, is that right?"
A. ccYes, sir."
Q. CCDid you tell Mr. Nelson that you had placed a
stop payment on that check?"
7
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• ''
A . ecyes, su.
Q. nYou told him at that time?''

A. nYes, sir.· I told Mr. Jones also. I called Mr. Jones
the same day and told him I had stopped pay. ment on his check.''

Q. But in any event you agreed to pay $2045.70, didn't
you?"
A. "I agreed to do that a dozen times."
On another occasion, on cross examination, Mr. Rice
again testified (Trans. 83):
A. Mr. Jones called me and he said that he had got
Mr. Frank Nelson to agree to take the contract
on this Ford and wanted me to call Frank. I called
Frank and he said that he was making the contract and wanted me to come down and sign it.
I asked him for what amount. He said it was for
$1600.00 plus the tax, sales tax, title, and license,
and I told him then that I had bought an insurance
policy for it and I would have Valley State Bank
make him a loss payable clause and send him the
policy. Well, then in that same conversation Mr.
Jones told me he was taking it for $1600.00 and
I told him at that moment and I said, "I am going
right down and stop payment on my check unless
you want to meet me at the bank and pay you
the hundred dollars and take up the check." He
said, "Well you understand the car is $1800 ?"
And I said, "I do not. I understand the car is
$1700.00 unless you put a six. tube radio in it."
I said, ((The car is $1700.00, exactly the same price
I had before." He said, ((We've got your check
and we're going to keep it.'' I went and put a stop
payment on it. I offered him a hundred dollars
for it and I offered to release it at the bank for
8
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it. In fact, I went in the bank and offered to make
these payn1ents and leave the money for them."
It is true that both Mr. Jones and Mr. Hunsaker disagreed
with Mr. Rice on many of the facts of the case; however, on
one point, both Mr. Jones and Mr. Hunsaker agree, and that is
that they never at any time discussed the purchase price of
the vehicle directly with Mr. Rice. Mr. Jones on cross examination testified with regard to the purchase price as follows
(Trans. 34):
Q. Was there anything said at that time about the
purchase price of this car would be $1700.00 without a radio or $1800.00 with a radio?"

A. He had made arrangements with another one of
Mr. Hunsaker's men about the price and I told
him I didn't know anything about that. That he
made the arrangements. All I told him-."
Q. Well then answer again was there anything said,
Mr. Jones, by Mr. Rice to you at that time that
there was an understanding or an agreement that
the car was to be $1700.00 without radio or
$1800.00 with a radio?"

A. No, sir. He did state that he would ask the price
of a radio and I didn't know, and I told him that
I would get him one at our cost.''
Q. ((And how much did you tell him that you wanted
of that price before you delivered the car ?"

A. ((I wanted $500.00 but I said I would settle for
$200.00."
Q. ((You wanted $500.00? You were supposed to
collect the full amount for the car, weren't you?"
A. ((It was left to my discretion. He told me to bring
the money back. He had arranged with the bank

9
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and I assumed there would be a cashier's check
waiting for me.''

Q. CCDo you know how much the cashier's check
would be?"
. ''
A . CCNO, Slr.
Q. t(Did Mr. Hunsaker tell you at any time how much
you were to bring back?''
. ,,
A. "NO, Slr.
Q. ccAll right. When you arrived there at the home of
Mr. Rice you were to bring back the money but
you didn't know how much you were to bring
back, is that right?"
A. "That's right."

Q. All right. Now at the time you arrived there, Mr.
Jones, did you at any time tell Mr. Rice any specific
amount that he was being charged for this cart

A. UNo. "
The Plaintiff, Mr. Hunsaker, testified regarding personal
arrangements with Mr. Rice as follows (Trans. 109):

Q. "Yes. Mr. Hunsaker, did you personally make this
arrangement with Mr. Rice?''
A. "Not personally, but I told the fellows that were
helping me what the deal was."
And on cross examination he testified (Trans. 110):
By MR. BARCLAY:

Q. "Mr. Hunsaker, did you ever at any time tell Mr.
Rice that the price was $1850.00 ?"

A. UNo. ,
10
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Q. {(Did you ever have any conversation with him at
all?"

A. No. Not before that. He had taken delivery."
Q. CCAnd did you ever have any conversation with Mr.
Rice at all about purchasing this Ford Mainline?''

A. ccNot until after it was purchased."
The record is quite confused on many points, but on the
point that there was never any meeting of the minds with
regard to the exact amount of the purchase price there can
be no doubt. On this basis, the Court should have allowed
the matter to be taken to the jury in accordance with the issues
framed in the Answer of the Defendant to the Plaintiff's
Complaint.
The Answer sets forth a denial that the Contract was
executed, except in blank; however, the facts clearly show that
the Contract in question was executed at the Walker Bank
& Trust Co. But, the Answer does go on to set forth the
claim that the purchase price was to be $1700.00 without a
radio or $1800.00 with a radio, and by reason of this misunderstanding, there was an issue as to whether there was
ever a Contract executed. In addition, the Answer goes on
to set forth that there was a failure of consideration by reason
of the Plaintiff's taking the automobile back, and this was a
proper issue for the jury to decide: Whether in the first place
there was a Contract, and whether there was a failure of this
Contract by reason of failure of consideration. The Defendant
in his Answer then goes on to set forth that by reason of the
foregoing facts, Defendant is entitled to cancellation of any
and all indebtedness which Plaintiff alleges to be due it from
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant, and that Defendant is entitled to cancellation of
such notes acknowledged by Plaintiff to be in existence since
the consideration for such instrument wholly failed and was
returned to Plaintiff.
It is also clear from the evidence that when Mr. Rice
signed a contract at the Bank, this executed Contract was
delivered to Mr. Frank Nelson conditionally upon Mr. Rice
being refunded $100.00 out of the $200.00 check on which
he had stopped payment or in the alternative that a six tube
radio was to be installed in the vehicle. Neither of these things
was done.
The general principle of law is stated in 3 American Jurisprudence, 439, paragraph 886:
CWhere the trial Court directs or refuses to direct
a verdict in favor of the Defendant (Plaintiff in this
case) the question of law before the reviewing Court is
not as to the weight of the evidence, but whether there
was any evidence which would have warranted a verdict
in favor of the Plaintiff (in this case the Defendant)
... For the purpose of determining the correctness of
the trial court's ruling, the Appellate Court will consider the evdence in its most favorable aspect for the
opposing party. The evidence of the one against whom
the verdict is directed in the trial court must be accepted as true."
c

In the case of Boskovitch vs. Utah Construction Company,
259 Pac. (2d) 885, at page 886, the Court has set out the basis
on which a trial Judge shoudl grant a directed verdict:
In deciding a. motion for a directed verdict, the
Court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the Motion is
t

c

12
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directed and must resolve every controverted fact in
his favor. (Cites cases.) The inquiry, then, must be
directed toward whether reasonable minds could disagree in this case on the evidence presented so as to
provide a question for the jury.''
The Court in directing this verdict took the attitude that
the only questions presented by the Answer of the Defendant
was whether the Plaintiff had ever agreed to a cancellation of
the Contract. There was no evidence on this point, but the
Court failed to give consideration to the other defenses set
out in Defendant's Answer, so that the Defendant might be
entitled to a cancellation by reason of the premises stated
above. The Court at one point questions counsel for the defense on this matter, and asks the question (Trans. 104):
Court ... HAs I say to the price of the car, you have
never raised an issue against that so I presume that
that is satisfactory to you. Isn't that right?"
A. c CThat' s right.''
We submit that the way the question was put, that counsel
for the defense misunder~tood the question directly, and that
the issue was before the Court was clearly stated in the Answer,
and should have been presented to the jury. To substantiate this
further, we call to your attention that later on the counsel
for the defense clearly sets forth his contention in a further
conversation between him and the Court (Trans. 103) :
THE COURT: "Well, of course, now there is no
pleading of thought here. Nobody pleads thought. You
don't plead it, do you, Mr. Barclay?"
A. CCI don't plead thought, no."

13
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THE COURT: ((You just claim that there is a different contract for $1700.00, that is what you allege?"
A. ((A different understanding, yes."
THE COURT: ((Well the fact of the matter is this
is the one that was signed on the 12th which I have
admitted is the one he says was destroyed, isn't it?"
A . ((yes. ''

Even the Defendant understood the theory of his case
as indicated by the answers given to Inetrrogatories from the
Court and Attorney for the Plaintiff (Trans. 100):
THE COURT: ((You just answer his question. That
is the trouble. There has been too much talk here."
Q. ((Has anyone-well now, I'll make it more specifichas Mr. Hunsaker or Mr. Jones or Mr. Nelson, or
any officer or agent of the bank ever cancelled this
note and contract, or agreed to cancel it with you?"

A. ttWell, I stated before that I went into the bank
and offered to make these paymentsTHE COURT: ((No. Just answer the question. Don't
tell us about your virtues.''
Q. ((Has anyone ever told you that you wouldn't have
to pay those?"
A.

HN0. "

Q. ((No one has ever told you that they would cancel
them and you wouldn't have to pay that note and
contract, have they? Answer the question."

A. ((My note and contract was with Walker Bank."
Q. ((Was what?"

A. ((Was with Walker Bank and when I went in to
agree to make the payments on the note and the
14
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contract it was with an understanding that the
car came to me at the price represented in the
original deal.''

Q. ccWell, did anybody ever tell you that they would
cancel that note and contract that you didn't have
to pay it? Now you can answer that yes or no."
THE COURT: "Mr. Rice, let me just read your
answer that you filed in this case. "Defendant further
alleges that the only instrument he at any time executed
and delivered to plaintiff was delivered by him to one
Oliver executed in blank by defendant with the understanding that such instrument would be filled in for
the sum of $1700.00 as the purchase price for an automobile without aradio and for the sum of $1800.00
as the purchase price of said automobile with the
radio." Now that is what you allege as your defense .. ,
• ''
A . ccyes, str.
Q. ccThen you allege that that deal that you made, that
I have just read, was canceled by these people when
they took the car back. Now that is your pleadings
that your attorney has filed here. Now let's find out
about that. Is that correct?''
A. ccwell, your Honor, it is gross misrepresentation,
to be frank about it, from the very beif. you
. want
,,
gmntng.
THE COURT: ccWell, now let's get down to this.
Is it correct that you signed a note and a contract in
bank with the understanding that it woud be $1700 ?"

• ''
A. ccyes, str.
THE COURT: ctWithout a radio and $1800.00 if it
did have a radio?"
. ,,
A . "Yes, str.
THE COURT: eels that correct?"
• ''
A. ccyes, str.

15
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3. The Court. erred in refusing to allow Exhibits 8 and 9
to be introduced into evidence. In the first place, when these
exhibits were first offered, the Court refused to accept them
on the basis that they were self serving. They were next used
by counsel for the Plaintiff in his ~irect examination of Mr.
Hunsaker (Trans. 110), and in spite. of the fact that the Court
indicated that they had not been accepted in evidence, counsel
for the Plaintiff used Exhibit 8 in his examination of his witness. This was immediately called to the attention of the Court,
but the Court still refused to allow the document in evidence.
In spite of the fact that the letter was not offered in evidence,
the record indicates at page 91 that it was an offer on the
part of Mr. Rice to pay $100.00. This letter should have been
admitted on the basis that there was a conflict as to the actual
terms of the written agreement and this served to substantiate the position of Mr. Rice in the matter.
4. The Court upon the stipulation of counsel gave oral
instructions which are unnumbered -except for the first. The
instructions as given prior to the argument of counsel are
improper in that the Court failed to cover the theories of both
parties in his instructions. In the case of Startin vs. Madsen,
23 7 Pac. ( 2d) 834, at page 836, this Court made the following
statement:
celt was the duty of the Court to cover the theories of
both parties in his instructions. (Citing cases.) If the
instructions ·are considered as a whole, as they must
be, (Citing cases) the Court adequately discharged his
duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury."
In this particular case, after all of the instructions were
given, the ~ourt then stated (Trans. 121):

16
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c~Now

the findings that I ·uv-ill :·. ·.binit to you and that
will be in writing will be ~-.s follows:
That will be in a form of a -~_:.estion .. Is the amount
of the $200.00 check to be deducted from the balance
of the Exhibits 3 and 2? .'1_nswer yes or no, depending
upon your b.ndings or dc.t:_L)erations. Sign blank line,
foreman."
The question as submitted ·'was pxuper, except that in no
place in the instructions -does the Court attempt to explain
to the jury the theory of the Pla::-.:tiif s ( r~se as explained above.
After the Attorneys argued their respective cases, the Court
then undertook to instruct the jury further, which is in specifiic
violation of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states in the last paragraph:
"Arguments for the respective parties shall be made
after the Court bas instructed the jury."
At page 121 and 122 of the record, the Court made the
following instruction after the Attorneys argued their cases:

THE COURT:

4

~There

is one other matter with regard to these other matters that have been here before
submitted and have been set forth in these pleadings
that I have indicated to you. By v i;tue of the evidence
that has been produced here I v1ill conclude as a matter
of law, and the finding will be made by me as a matter
of law, or other subjects relative to this -matter. There
is no disputable question for you to determine other
than these that I have submitted to you.H
C(Ladies and Gentlemen, I ar.o going to have the Clerk
prepare a directed verdict, which I will require, and
direct the foreman of the ;ury to sign for the amount
prayed for by this plaintiff, adding to or deducting this
$200.00 that I have mentioned to you, depending upon

17
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what your finding is and this verdict that I will also
hand ~o you wiH. be with or without attorney's fees,
depending upon what your findings are on that verdict
that: I_ will submit to :you fqr your deliberations at the
eQ.d ·of this case."
:.
It is to be -noted that this inst~uctio~ .relative to the form
of the questoin to be · submitted is cha~ged from t~e form
~

.

: .

.t~

quoted above. This_ undoubtedly contfibuted to the confusion
of the jury; but ~ev-en more confusing'" there ensued a discussion
by Counsel for_· the Plaintiff and the Court as to whether the
instruction secondly given was proper. The jury was dismissed
without the point being resolved and the effect was contradictory
instructions being given to the jury. After the jury retired to
deliberate upon the verdict, the Court then asked the parties
to stipulate _with regard to the correc! i~sue in reference to the
check. However, at this point the damage was done and it was
too late to correct it by stipulation of _Cou~sel. The proper issues
were never presented to the jury fq! their consideration.
It can be. argued that in as much -as the Defendant failed
to object or take exception to the instructions before they were
submitted to the jury, he waived his rights to do so thereafter.
Utah Rules· of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, does not specifically refer to Interrogatories subrn_itted to the jury. However,
this Court in. the case of Coqper vs. Evans, et al. ( 262 Pac.
(2d) 278), 1 Utah (2d) 68, at page 70, made the following
statement:
nThe Rule 51 does not expressly refer to special interrogatories but generally speaking, the same principle is undoubtedly sound as applied to them also."

fs
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The Court then goes ay to point out that in that particular
case counsel were given no opportunity object to such interrogatories, and we feel that the same argument applies in this
case. The writer was ~ot the Attorney who tried this case in
the District Court; how~ver, it appears upon reading the record
that at no time were the Attorneys .given an opportunity to
object or take exceptioo to the .interrogatories, or to the instructions, and therefore, we believe that it cannot be said that
the Defendant has waived his right to object to the interrogatories or to the instructions given. At pag~ 123 the Court
stops the discussion, so that the jury could be sent out.

to

It would appear that the Court in making additional instructions after the argument ot counsel and by allowing
counsel for the Plaintiff to discuss the instractions, that the
jury was plainly impressed that the only answer that could
be given to the interrogatories finally submitted was yes. The
whole procedure was completely <:ontrary to the requirements
of Rule 51, U.R.C.P.
5. Finally, we wish to call to your attention the discrepancies in the evidence with regard to the te$mony concerning the sum of money received for the automobile when
it was sold across the Salt Lake City Auction. In the first place,
in the answers to the Interrogatories, Answer No. 12, the
sum given was $1,080.00. Secondly, Mr. Vic Jones, who apparently was the person who 'handled the sale at the .Salt Lake
City Auction, testified that the amount received was $1,170.00,
and finally Mr. Thomas Hunsaker, the Plaintiff, testified that
the sum of $1,070.00 was recovered. From the verdict given,
it is obvious that the figures testified to by Mr. Hunsaker were

19
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used, although the matter is .not called to the attention of
the jury, except that the Court in its first instruction refers to
the Plaintiff's Complaint, and uses the figures of Plaintiff. It
would seem.that thereby the Court instructed the jury to accept
this figure and disrega~d the testimony and this matter was
taken from the hands of the jury. The jury should have been
left to determine which of the statements it would believe,
but it had no opportunity ,to ~o so.
WHEREFORE, the Def~ndant. prays that the said Judgment
in said entitled cause be reversed and. that the Defendant have
its costs herein incurred or in the alternative that the case be
remanded to the District Court for a new trial.
Defendant prays for such other and further relief as may
be meet in the premises.
Respectfully submitted,
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON
VERDEN E. BETTILYON
Counsel for Appellant
519 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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